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Abstract
In safety-critical but computationally resource-constrained applications, deep learn-
ing faces two key challenges: lack of robustness against adversarial attacks and
large neural network size (often millions of parameters). While the research com-
munity has extensively explored the use of robust training and network pruning
independently to address one of these challenges, only a few recent works have
studied them jointly. However, these works inherit a heuristic pruning strategy
that was developed for benign training, which performs poorly when integrated
with robust training techniques, including adversarial training and verifiable robust
training. To overcome this challenge, we propose to make pruning techniques
aware of the robust training objective and let the training objective guide the search
for which connections to prune. We realize this insight by formulating the pruning
objective as an empirical risk minimization problem which is solved efficiently us-
ing SGD. We demonstrate that our approach, titled HYDRA1, achieves compressed
networks with state-of-the-art benign and robust accuracy, simultaneously. We
demonstrate the success of our approach across CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet
dataset with four robust training techniques: iterative adversarial training, random-
ized smoothing, MixTrain, and CROWN-IBP. We also demonstrate the existence of
highly robust sub-networks within non-robust networks. Our code and compressed
networks are publicly available2.
1 Introduction
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Figure 1: Comparison of our proposed approach (?)
and least-weight magnitude based pruning (+) for ad-
versarial training (l∞ ≤ ) with VGG16 network
and CIFAR-10 dataset. For both a weaker adversary
(=2/255) or a stronger adversary (=8/255), our pro-
posed technique leads to higher empirical robust accu-
racy where the gap increases with compression ratio.
How can we train deep neural networks (DNNs)
that are robust against adversarial examples
while minimizing the size of the neural network?
In safety-critical and resource-constrained envi-
ronments, both robustness and compactness are
simultaneously necessary. However, existing
work is limited in its ability to answer this ques-
tion since it has largely addressed these chal-
lenges in isolation. For example, neural network
pruning is an efficient approach to minimize the
size of the neural networks. In parallel, robust
training can significantly improve the adversar-
ial robustness of neural networks. However, im-
proving adversarial robustness has been shown
to require even larger networks [30, 49]. Thus it
is even more critical to ask whether network pruning techniques can reduce the size of the network,
i.e., number of connections, while preserving robustness?
1a small organism with high resiliency and biological immortality due to regenerative abilities.
2https://github.com/inspire-group/compactness-robustness
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A gold standard for network pruning has been the approach of Han et al. [19], which prunes
connections that have the lowest weight magnitude (LWM) under the assumption that they are the
least useful. Sehwag et al. [34] demonstrated early success of LWM pruning with adversarially robust
networks while Ye et al. [45] and Gui et al. [15] further improved its performance by integrating with
alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) based optimization. These works inherit the
heuristic assumption that connections with the least magnitude are also unimportant in the presence
of robust training. While both LWM and ADMM based pruning techniques are highly successful with
benign training [19, 50], they incur a huge performance degradation with adversarial training. Our
design goal is to develop a pruning technique which achieves high performance and also generalizes
to multiple types of robust training objectives including verifiable robustness [30, 49, 38, 48, 8].
Instead of inheriting a pruning heuristic and applying it to all robust training objectives, we argue
that a better approach is to make the pruning technique aware of the robust training objective itself.
We achieve this by formulating the pruning step, i.e., deciding which connections to prune, as an
empirical risk minimization problem with a robust training objective, which can be solved efficiently
using stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Our formulation is generalizable and can be integrated
with multiple types of robust training objectives including verifiable robustness. Given a pre-trained
network, we optimize the importance score [32] for each connection in the pruning step while keeping
the fine-tuning step intact. Connections with the lowest importance scores are pruned away. We
propose a scaled initialization of importance scores, which is a key driver behind the high benign and
robust accuracy of our compressed networks.
Our proposed technique achieves much higher robust accuracy compared to LWM. Fig. 1 shows
these results for adversarial training with both a weaker (=2) and a stronger (=8) adversary. With
increasing pruning ratios, the gap between the robust accuracy achieved with both techniques further
increases. Due to the accuracy-robustness trade-off in DNNs [49, 30], a rigorous comparison of
pruning techniques should consider both benign and robust accuracy. We demonstrate that our
compressed networks simultaneously achieve both state-of-the-art benign and robust accuracy.
Recently, Ramanujan et al. [32] demonstrated that there exist hidden sub-networks with high benign
accuracy within randomly initialized networks. Using our pruning technique, we extend this observa-
tion to robust training, where we uncover highly robust (both empirical and verifiable) sub-networks
within non-robust networks. In particular, within empirically robust networks that have no verifiable
robustness, we found sub-networks with verified robust accuracy close to the state-of-the-art [33].
Key contributions: We make the following key contributions.
• We develop a novel pruning technique, which is aware of the robust training objective, by formulat-
ing it as an empirical risk minimization problem, which we solve efficiently with SGD. We show
the generalizability of our formulation by considering multiple types of robust training objectives,
including verifiable robustness. We employ an importance score based optimization technique
with our proposed scaled initialization of importance scores, which is the key driver behind the
success of our approach.
• We evaluate the proposed approach across four robust training objectives, namely iterative adver-
sarial training [7, 30, 49], randomized smoothing [8, 7], MixTrain [38], and CROWN-IBP [48] on
CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet dataset with multiple network architectures. Notably, at 99%
connection pruning ratio, we achieve gains up to 3.2, 11.2, and 17.8 percentage points in robust
accuracy, while simultaneously achieving state-of-the-art benign accuracy, compared to previous
works [34, 45, 15] for ImageNet, CIFAR-10, and SVHN dataset, respectively.
• We also demonstrate the existence of highly robust sub-networks within non-robust or weakly
robust networks. In particular, within empirically robust networks that have no verifiable robustness,
we were able to find sub-networks with verified robust accuracy close to state-of-the-art.
2 Background and related work
Robust training. Robust training is one of the primary defenses against adversarial examples [5,
13, 6, 30, 3] where it can be divided into two categories: Adversarial training and verifiable robust
training. The key objective of adversarial training is to minimize the training loss on adversarial
examples obtained with iterative adversarial attacks, such as projected gradient descent (PGD) [30]
based attacks, under the following formulation.
min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
Ladv(θ, x, y,Ω), Ladv(θ, x, y,Ω) = L(θ, PGD
δ∈Ω
(x), y) (1)
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Verifiable robust training provides provable robustness guarantees by minimizing a sound over-
approximation to the worse-case loss Lver(θ, x, y,Ω) under a given perturbation budget. We focus
on two state-of-the-art verifiable robust training approaches: (1) MixTrain [38] based on linear
relaxations, and (2) CROWN-IBP [47] based on interval bound propagation (IBP). We also consider
randomized smoothing [8, 26, 33, 24], which aims to provide certified robustness by leveraging
network robustness against Gaussian noise.
Neural network pruning. Network pruning aims to compress neural networks by reducing the
number of parameters to enhance efficiency in resource-constrained environments [19, 18, 27, 11, 25,
16, 29, 23]. One such highly successful approach is a three-step compression pipeline [19, 16]. It
involves pre-training a network, pruning it, and later fine-tuning it. In the pruning step, we obtain a
binary mask (mˆ), which determines which connections are most important. In the fine-tuning step, we
only update the non-pruned connections to recover the performance. We refer the network obtained
after fine-tuning as the compressed network. Note that both pruning and fine-tuning steps can be
alternatively repeated to perform multi-step pruning [19], which incurs extra computational cost. In
addition to this compression pipeline, network pruning can be performed with training, i.e, run-time
pruning [28, 4] or before training [11, 25, 37]. We focus on pruning after training, in particular, LWM
based pruning, since it still outperforms multiple other techniques (Table 1 in Lee et al. [25]) and is a
long-standing gold standard for pruning techniques.
Pruning with robust training. Sehwag et al. [34] demonstrated that empirical adversarial robustness
can be achieved with LWM based pruning heuristic. Ye et al. [45] and Gui et al. [15] further employed
an alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) pruning framework [50], while still using
LWM based pruning heuristic, to achieve better empirical robustness for compressed networks.
We refer these previous works as Adv-LWM and Adv-ADMM respectively. In contrast, our work
introduces an intellectually different direction as we let the robust training objective itself decide
which connections to prune. Our compressed networks achieve both better accuracy and robustness
than the previous works. In addition, our work is also the first 1) to study network pruning with
verifiable robust training where we achieve heavily pruned networks with high verifiable robust
accuracy, and 2) to demonstrate robust and compressed networks for the ImageNet dataset.
Some of these works [15, 42] also focused on other aspects of compression which are also applicable
to our technique, such as quantization of weights. Another related line of research aims to use pruning
itself to instill robustness against adversarial examples [10, 41, 17]. However, either these works are
not successful at very high very pruning ratios [17, 41] (we focus on ≥ 90% pruning ratios) or give a
false sense of security as the robustness is diminished in the presence of an adaptive attacker [10, 2].
3 HYDRA: Our approach to network pruning with robust training
A central question in making robust networks compact is to decide which connections to prune? In
LWM based pruning, irrespective of the training objective, connections with lowest weight magnitude
are pruned away, with the assumption that those connections are the least useful. We argue that a
better approach would be to perform an architecture search for a neural network with the desired
pruning ratio that has the least drop in targeted accuracy metric compared to the pre-trained network.
We achieve this by formulating pruning as an empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem and
integrating it with a robust training objective. Our formulation is generalizable where we show its
integration with multiple empirical and verifiable robust training objectives, including adversarial
training, MixTrain, CROWN-IBP, and randomized smoothing. We employ an importance score based
optimization [32] approach to solve the ERM problem. However, we find that naive initialization of
importance scores [20, 12, 32] brings little to no gain in the performance of compressed networks.
We thus propose a scaled initialization of importance scores, and show that it enables our approach to
simultaneously achieve state-of-the-art benign and robust accuracy at high pruning ratios. In addition,
we also demonstrate the existence of hidden robust sub-networks within non-robust networks.
Pruning as an empirical risk minimization problem (ERM) with adversarial loss objectives.
To recover performance loss incurred with a pruning heuristic such as LWM, a standard approach is
to fine-tune the network. In contrast, we explicitly aim to reduce the degradation of performance in
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the pruning step itself. We achieve this by integrating the robust training objective in the pruning
strategy itself by formulating it as the following learning problem.
mˆ = argmin
m∈{0, 1}N
E
(x,y)∼D
[Lpruning(θpretrain m,x, y)] s.t. ‖m‖0 ≤ k (2)
θm refers to the element-wise multiplication of mask (m) with the weight parameters (θ). Predefined
pruning ratio of the network can be written as
(
1− kN
)
, where k is the number of parameters we keep
after pruning and N = |θpretrain| is the total number of parameters in the pre-trained network. Our
formulation is generalizable and can be integrated with different types of robust training objectives
by selecting Lpruning equal to Ladv or Lver (Section 2). Since the distribution D is unknown, we
minimize the empirical loss over the training data using SGD. The generated pruning mask mˆ is then
used in the fine-tuning step.
Importance score based optimization. It is challenging to directly optimize over the mask m since
it is binary (either the weight parameter is pruned or not). Instead, we follow the importance scores
based optimization [32]. It assigns an importance score (floating-point) to each weight indicating
its importance to the predictions on all input samples and optimizes based on the score. While
making a prediction, it only selects the top-k weights with the highest magnitude of importance
scores. However, on the backward pass, it will update all scores with their gradients.
Scaled-initialization. We observe that the performance of the proposed pruning approach depends
heavily on the initialization of importance scores. At high pruning ratios, which we study in
this work, we observe slow and poor convergence of SGD with random initialization [20, 12] of
importance scores. To overcome this challenge, we propose a scaled initialization for importance
scores (Equation 3) where instead of random values, we initialize importance scores proportional
to pre-trained network weights. With scaled-initialization we thus give more importance to large
weights at the start and let the optimizer find a better set of pruned connections.
s
(0)
i ∝
1
max(|θpretrain,i|) × θpretrain,i (3)
where θpretrain,i is the weight corresponding to ith layer in the pre-trained network. We normalize
each layer weight to map it to [-1, 1] range. For the concrete scaling factor in Eq. 3, we use
√
6
fan-ini
,
motivated from He et al. [20], where fan-in is the product of the receptive field size and the number
of input channels. We provide additional ablation studies on choice of different scaling factors in
Appendix B.1. We summarize our pipeline to compress networks in Algorithm 1.
While our approach to solving the optimization problem in the pruning step is inspired by Ramanujan
et al. [32], our key objective is to focus on adversarially robust networks, which is different from their
work. In addition, as we demonstrate in section 4.1, without the proposed scaled initialization, solving
the optimization problem in the pruning step brings negligible gains. The objective in Ramanujan et
al. [32] is to find sub-networks with high benign accuracy, hidden in a randomly initialized network,
without the use of fine-tuning. Next, we present a more general formulation of their objective below.
Imbalanced training objectives: Hidden robust sub-networks within non-robust networks. To
optimize for a robustness metric in the compressed network, we use its corresponding loss function in
both pre-training and pruning. But what if we use different loss functions in pre-training and pruning
steps (no fine-tuning)? For example, if we select Lpruning = Lver, where Lpretrain = Lbenign, it will
search for verifiable robust sub-network within a benign, non-robust network. Using our pruning
approach, we uncover the existence of robust sub-networks within non-robust networks in Section 5.
4 Experiments
We conduct extensive experiments across three datasets, namely CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet.
We first establish strong baselines and then show that our method outperforms them significantly and
achieves state-of-the-art accuracy and robustness simultaneously for compressed networks.
Setup. We experiment with VGG-16 [36], Wide-ResNet-28-4 [46], CNN-small, and CNN-large [43]
network architectures. The l∞ perturbation budget for adversarial training is 8/255 for CIFAR-10,
SVHN and 4/255 for ImageNet. For verifiable robust training, we choose an l∞ perturbation budget of
2/255 in all experiments. These design choices are consistent with previous work [7, 38, 47]. We used
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PGD attacks with 50 steps and 10 restarts to measure era. We use state-of-the-art adversarial training
approach from Carmon et al. [7] which supersedes earlier adversarial training techniques [30, 49, 22].
We present a detailed version of our experimental setup in appendix A.
Metrics We use following metrics to capture the performance of trained networks. 1) Benign
accuracy: It is the percentage of correctly classified benign (i.e., non-modified) images. 2) Empirical
robust accuracy (era): It refers to the percentage of correctly classified adversarial examples generated
with projected gradient descent based attacks. 3) Verified robust accuracy (vra): Vra corresponds
to verified robust accuracy, and vra-m, vra-t, and vra-s correspond to vra obtained from MixTrain,
CROWN-IBP, and randomized smoothing, respectively. We refer pre-trained networks as PT.
Algorithm 1 End-to-end compression pipeline.
Inputs: Neural network parameters (θ), Loss ob-
jective: Lpretrain, Lprune, Lfinetune, Importance
scores (s), pruning ratio (p)
Output: Compressed network, i.e., θfinetune
Step 1: Pre-train the network.
θpretrain = argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
[Lpretrain(θ, x, y)]
Step 2: Initialize scores (s) for each layer.
s
(0)
i =
√
6
fan-ini
× 1
max(|θpretrain,i|)×θpretrain,i
Step 3: Minimize pruning loss.
sˆ = argmin
s
E
(x,y)∼D
[Lprune(θpretrain, s, x, y)]
Step 4: Create binary pruning mask mˆ = 1(|sˆ| >
|sˆ|k), |sˆ|k: kth percentile of |sˆ|, k = 100− p
Step 5: Finetune the non-pruned connections,
starting from θpretrain.
θfinetune = argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
[Lfinetune(θ  mˆ, x, y)]
Table 1: Benign accuracy/era of compressed net-
works obtained with pruning from scratch, LWM,
random initialization, and proposed pruning tech-
nique with scaled initialization. We use CIFAR-10
dataset and VGG16 network in this experiment.
Pruning ratio PT 90% 95% 99%
Scaled-initialization
82.7
/51.9
80.5/49.5 78.9/48.7 73.2/41.7
Scratch 74.7/45.6 71.5/42.3 34.4/24.6
LWM [19] 78.8/47.7 76.7/45.2 63.2/34.1
Xavier-normal 74.8/45.2 72.5/42.3 65.4/36.8
Xavier-uniform 75.1/45.0 73.0/42.4 65.8/36.5
Kaiming-normal 75.3/44.9 72.4/42.1 66.3/36.5
Kaiming-uniform 75.0/44.8 73.3/42.5 66.1/36.4
Table 2: Comparison of our approach with Adv-
ADMM based pruning. We use CIFAR-10 dataset
and VGG16 networks, iterative adversarial train-
ing from Madry et al. [30] for this experiment.
Pruning ratio PT 90% 95% 99%
Adv-ADMM
79.4/44.2
76.3/44.4 72.9/43.6 55.2/34.1
HYDRA 76.6/45.1 74.0/44.7 59.9/37.9
∆ +0.3/+0.7 +1.1/+1.1 +4.7/+3.8
4.1 Network pruning with HYDRA
We now demonstrate the success of our pruning technique in achieving highly compressed networks.
In this subsection, we will focus on CIFAR-10 dataset, VGG-16 network, and adversarial training [7].
We present our detailed results later in Section 4.2 across multiple datasets, networks, pruning ratios,
and robust training techniques. Our results (Table 1, 2 and Figure 1) demonstrate that the proposed
method can achieve compression ratio as high as 100x while achieving much better benign and robust
accuracy compared to other baselines. In summary: 1) HYDRA improves both benign accuracy
and robustness simultaneously over previous works (including Adv-LWM and Adv-ADMM), 2)
HYDRA improves performance at multiple perturbations budgets (see Figure 1), 3) HYDRA’s
improvements over prior works increase with compression ratio, and 4) HYDRA generalizes as it
achieves state-of-the-art performance across four different robust training techniques (Section 4.2).
A key driver behind the success of HYDRA is the scaled initialization of importance scores in
pruning. We found that widely used random initializations [20, 12], with either Gaussian or uniform
distribution, perform even worse than training from scratch, our first baseline which we discuss below
(Table 1). In contrast, architecture search with our scaled-initialization can significantly improve both
benign accuracy and era of the compressed networks simultaneously, at all pruning ratios.
Validating empirical robustness with stronger attacks. To further determine that robustness in
compressed networks in not arising from phenomenon such as gradient masking [31, 2], we evaluate
them with much stronger PGD attacks (up to 100 restarts and 1000 attack steps) along with an
ensemble of gradient-based and gradient-free attacks [9]. Our results confirm that the compressed
networks show similar trend as non-compressed nets with these attacks (Appendix A.1). Note that vra
already provides a lower bound of robustness against all possible attacks in the given threat model.
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Comparison with training from scratch. If the objective is to achieve a compressed and robust
network, a natural question is why not train on a compact network from scratch? However, we observe
in Table 1 that it achieves poor performance. For example, at 99% pruning ratio, the compressed
network has only 24.6% era which is 27.3 and 17.1 percentage points lower than the non-compressed
network and our approach, respectively. We present a detailed analysis in Appendix C.1.
Comparison with Adv-LWM based robust pruning. LWM based pruning with robust training
(following Sehwag et al. [34]) is able to partially improve the robustness of compressed networks
compared to training from scratch. At 99% pruning ratio, it improves the era to 34.1% but this
is still 17.8 and 7.6 percentage points lower than a non-compressed network and our proposed
approach, respectively. We observe similar gaps when varying adversarial strength in adversarial
training (Figure 1). Furthermore, our approach also achieves up to 10 percentage points higher benign
accuracy compared to Adv-LWM. Note that our method also outperforms LWM based pruning with
benign training (Appendix C.6). We use only 20 epochs in the pruning step (with 100 epochs in both
pre-training and fine-tuning), thus incurring only 1.1× the computational overhead over Adv-LWM.
Comparison with Adv-ADMM based robust pruning. Finally, we compare our approach with
ADMM based robust pruning [45, 15] in Table 2. Note that Ye et al. [45] have reported results with a
former adversarial training technique [30] while we use the state-of-the-art techniques [49, 7]. Thus
for a fair comparison, we use the exact same adversarial training technique, network architecture, and
pre-trained network checkpoints as their work. Our approach outperforms ADMM based pruning at
every pruning ratio and achieves up to 4.7 and 3.8 percentage point improvement in benign accuracy
and era, respectively (Table 2). Adv-ADMM uses 100 epochs in pruning (compared to 20 epochs in
our work), making it 5× and 1.36× more time consuming than our approach in the pruning step and
overall, respectively. In addition, while Adv-ADMM has been shown to work with only adversarial
training, our approach also generalizes to multiple verifiable robust training techniques.
Ablation studies. First, we vary the amount of data used in solving ERM in pruning step. Though a
small number of images do not help much, the transition happens around 10% of the training data (5k
images on CIFAR-10) after which an increasing amount of data helps in significantly improving the
era (Appendix B.2). Next, we vary the number of epochs in the pruning step from one to a hundred.
We observe that even a small number of pruning epochs, such as five, are sufficient to achieve large
gains in era and further gains start diminishing as we increase the number of epochs (Appendix B.3).
4.2 Results across multiple datasets and robust training techniques
Table 3 presents the experimental results on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets across three pruning
ratios, two network architectures, and four different robust training objectives. The key characteristics
of the proposed pruning approach from these results are synthesized below:
Improved robustness across datasets, architectures, and robust training objectives. Across
most experiments in Table 3, HYDRA achieves a significant improvement in robust accuracy with a
mean and maximum improvement of 5.1 and 34.1 percentage points, respectively. Specifically, it
achieves a mean improvement in robust accuracy by 5.6, 3.9, 2.0, 8.8 percentage points for adversarial
training, randomized smoothing, CROWN-IBP, and MixTrain approach, respectively.
Improved benign accuracy along with robustness. Our approach not only improves robustness, but
also the benign accuracy of pruned networks simultaneously across most experiments. Specifically,
it achieves a mean improvement in benign accuracy by 5.4, 3.9, 2.6, 13.1 percentage points for
adversarial training, randomized smoothing, CROWN-IBP, and MixTrain approach, respectively.
Higher gains with an increase in pruning ratio. At 99% pruning ratio, not only is our approach
never worse than the baseline but it also achieves the highest gains in robust accuracy. For example,
for VGG16 network with CIFAR-10 dataset at 99% pruning ratio, our approach is able to achieve
7.6 and 10.3 percentage points higher era and vra-s. These improvements are larger than the gains
obtained at smaller pruning ratios. At very high pruning ratios for CROWN-IBP and MixTrain, the
pruned networks with our approach are also more likely to converge.
Help increase generalization for some cases. Interestingly, we observe that our pruning approach
can obtain robust accuracy even higher than pre-trained networks. For the SVHN dataset and WRN-
28-4 network, we observe an increase by 2.7 and 0.1 percentage points for adversarial training and
randomized smoothing, respectively at 90% pruning ratio. For verifiable training with CROWN-IBP,
we observe improvement in vra-t from 0.9-1.8 percentage points for networks pruned at 90% ratio.
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Table 3: Experimental results (benign/robust accuracy) for empirical test accuracy (era) and verifiable robust
accuracy based on MixTrain (vra-m), randomized smoothing (vra-s), and CROWN-IBP (vra-t).
(a) Adversarial training (era)
Architecture VGG-16 WRN-28-4
Method Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆ Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 PT 82.7/51.9 85.6/57.2
90% 78.8/47.7 80.5/49.5 +0.7/+1.8 82.8/53.8 83.7/55.2 +0.9/+1.4
95% 76.7/45.2 78.9/48.7 +2.2/+3.5 79.3/48.8 82.7/54.2 +3.4/+5.4
99% 63.2/34.1 73.2/41.7 +10.0/+7.6 66.6/36.1 75.6/47.3 +9.0/+11.2
SV
H
N
PT 90.5/53.5 93.5/60.1
90% 89.2/51.5 89.2/52.4 0/+0.9 92.3/59.4 94.4/62.8 +2.1/+3.4
95% 84.9/50.4 85.5/51.7 +0.6/+1.3 90.4/53.4 93.0/59.8 +2.6/+6.4
99% 50.4/29.0 84.3/46.8 +33.9/+17.8 82.8/45.3 82.2/52.4 - 0.6/+7.1
(b) Randomized smoothing (vra-s)
Architecture VGG-16 WRN-28-4
Method Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆ Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 PT 82.1/61.1 85.7/63.3
90% 82.3/59.6 83.4/60.7 +1.1/+1.1 82.3/61.0 85.6/63.0 +3.3/+2.0
95% 80.3/56.8 83.1/59.9 +2.8/+3.1 80.3/59.9 84.5/62.5 +4.2/+2.4
99% 65.1/44.1 77.1/54.4 +12.0/+10.3 65.1/49.1 78.2/56.0 +13.1/+6.9
SV
H
N
PT 92.8/60.1 92.7/62.2
90% 92.4/59.9 92.7/59.9 +0.3/0.0 92.4/62.2 92.8/62.3 +0.4/+0.1
95% 92.2/59.8 92.4/59.3 +0.2/- 0.6 92.2/61.4 93.1/62.0 +0.9/+0.6
99% 87.5/51.9 91.4/58.6 +3.9/+6.7 87.5/45.0 91.8/59.6 +4.3/+14.6
(c) CROWN-IBP (vra-t)
Architecture CNN-small CNN-large
Method Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆ Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 PT 53.3/42.0 58.0/45.5
90% 53.5/42.4 53.5/42.9 +0.0/+0.5 58.9/46.9 59.1/47.0 +0.2/+0.1
95% 49.7/40.3 49.5/40.0 - 0.2/- 0.3 57.2/46.1 57.8/46.2 +0.6/+0.1
99% 19.8/17.3 34.6/29.5 +14.8/+12.2 42.9/34.6 47.7/39.4 +4.8/+4.8
SV
H
N
PT 59.9/40.8 68.5/47.1
90% 59.1/40.3 60.4/40.6 +1.3/+0.3 69.2/48.5 68.8/48.9 - 0.4/+0.4
95% 49.4/34.8 53.0/36.7 +3.6/+1.9 69.0/47.2 69.2/47.6 +0.2/+0.4
99% 19.6/19.6 19.6/19.6 0.0/0.0 50.1/38.2 56.3/42.8 +6.2/+4.6
(d) MixTrain (vra-m)
Architecture CNN-small CNN-large
Method Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆ Adv-LWM HYDRA ∆
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 PT 62.5/46.8 63.8/47.7
90% 46.9/35.3 54.8/41.0 +7.9/+5.7 63.3/47.1 65.7/49.6 +2.4/+2.5
95% 29.4/24.0 50.7/38.3 +21.3/+14.3 50.6/39.3 60.2/45.3 +9.6/+6.0
99% 10.0/10.0 27.0/24.9 +17.0/+14.9 30.0/25.8 42.7/35.3 +12.7/+9.5
SV
H
N
PT 72.5/48.4 77.0/56.9
90% 60.3/41.6 57.5/45.7 - 2.8/+4.1 77.9/57.0 78.4/57.9 +0.5/+0.9
95% 19.6/19.6 52.5/33.7 +32.9/+14.1 19.6/19.6 74.8/53.7 +55.2/+34.1
99% 19.6/19.6 19.6/19.6 0.0/0.0 19.6/19.6 19.6/19.6 0.0/0.0
Table 4: Era for ResNet50 network trained on ImageNet
dataset with adversarial training for =4/255.
Pruning ratio PT 95% 99%
top-1 top-5 top-1 top-5 top-1 top-5
Adv-LWM
60.2/32.0 82.4/61.1
45.0/19.6 70.2/43.3 24.8/9.8 47.8/24.4
HYDRA 47.1/21.4 72.2/46.6 31.5/13.0 56.2/31.2
∆ +2.1/+1.8 +2.0/+3.3 +6.7/+3.2 +8.4/+6.8
Similar improvements are also observed for
CNN-large with MixTrain. Note that the im-
provement mostly happens for WRN-28-4 and
CNN-large architectures, where both networks
achieve better robust accuracy than their coun-
terparts. This suggests that there still exists a
potential room for improving the generalization
of these models with robust training. We present additional results in Appendix C.4.
Performance on ImageNet dataset. To assess the performance of pruning techniques on large-scale
datasets, we experiment with the ImageNet dataset. Table 4 summarizes our results. Similar to
smaller-scale datasets, our approach also outperforms LWM based pruning for the ImageNet dataset.
In particular, at 99% pruning ratio, our approach improves the top-1 era by 3.2 percentage points,
and the top-5 era by 6.8 percentage points.
5 Imbalanced training objectives: Hidden robust sub-networks within
non-robust networks.
Table 5: Performance of sub-networks within pre-
trained networks. Given a pre-trained network, we
search for a sub-network optimized for one metric from
benign accuracy, era (=8/255), or vra-s (=2/255).
Pre-training
objective
Targeted metric for each sub-network
benign accuracy era vra-s
Benign
training
(benign
accuracy = 95.0)
95.0 43.5 53.0
Adversarial
training
(era = 51.9) 94.1 51.4 63.6
Randomized
smoothing
(vra = 61.1) 93.7 48.8 60.7
We have already demonstrated that the success
of HYDRA stems from finding a set of connec-
tions which, when pruned, incurs least degra-
dation in the pre-trained network robustness.
What if the pre-trained network is trained with
a different objective than pruning? To answer
this question, we prune a pre-trained network
with three different objectives (no fine-tuning),
namely benign training, adversarial training, and
randomized smoothing. These results are pre-
sented in Table 5 where the pruning ratio for
each sub-network is 50% with VGG16 network
and CIFAR-10 dataset.
Our results show that there exist highly robust sub-networks even within non-robust networks. For
example, we were able to find a sub-network with 43.5% era when the pre-trained network was
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trained with benign training and had 0% era. As a reference, the pre-trained network with adversarial
training has 51.9% era.
Surprisingly, in networks pre-trained with adversarial training, we found sub-networks with really
high verified robust accuracy from randomized smoothing. For example, when searched with
randomized smoothing technique from Carmon et al [7], we found a sub-network with 63.6% robust
accuracy on CIFAR10 dataset. 3 Note that the sub-network has a higher vra-s than 60.7%, which is
achieved with a network pre-trained with randomized smoothing from Carmon et al. [7]. Under a
similar setup, we also find a sub-network with 61.3% vra-s within an adversarially trained network
on SVHN dataset. In comparison, a pre-trained network could only achieve 60.1% vra-s.
6 Delving deeper into network pruning and concluding remarks
−0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
101
103
Layer - 6
Pre-trained
LWM
Our work
(a) Adversarial training
0.0 0.2
101
103
Layer - 6
Pre-trained
LWM
Our work
(b) Randomized smoothing
−0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
101
103
Layer - 3
Pre-trained
LWM
Our work
(c) MixTrain
−1 0 1
101
103
105
Layer - 3
Pre-trained
LWM
Our work
(d) CROWN-IBP
Figure 2: Comparison of the weights preserved by each pruning technique. In background, we display the
histogram of weights for the pre-trained network. Then we show the weights preserved by each technique after
pruning (without fine-tuning). Note that the proposed pruning technique tends to preserve small-magnitude
weights as opposed to other large-magnitude weights preserved by LWM. We use 99% pruning ratio with VGG16
network in figure (a), (b) and with CNN-large networks in figure (c), (d), and train on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Visualizing which connections are being pruned. We visualize the distributions of weights in
pruned networks from our proposed approach and the Adv-LWM baseline in Figure 2. There are
two key insights 1) Our search for a better pruned architecture is likely to find connections with very
small magnitudes unnecessary and prunes them away. 2) However, in contrast to the LWM heuristic,
our approach does favor pruning some large-magnitude weights instead of smaller ones. We present
more detailed visualizations in Appendix D.
Further compression after integration with quantization (Appendix C.7). We found that our
pruned networks (even at 99% pruning ratio) can be quantized by 8-bits while only incurring <0.5
percentage point decrease in both benign and robust accuracy. This brings another 4x compression
factor in already heavily pruned (10x-100x) networks.
Multi-step pruning (Appendix C.8). To reduce computational overhead, so far we only used a
single pruning step. On ImageNet dataset, even when we use a multi-step (20-steps) Adv-LWM
technique, our approach, which still uses a single pruning step, outperforms it by a large extent.
Structured pruning (Appendix C.9). Structured pruning, i.e., pruning filters instead of connections,
has a much stronger impact on performance [27]. When pruning 50% filters with LWM technique,
the era of VGG16 network decreases from 51% to 34.7% on CIFAR-10. Our approach achieves
38.0% era while also achieving 1.1 percentage point higher benign accuracy than Adv-LWM.
Lower degradation in era for over-parameterized networks. With 90% pruning for the over-
parameterized WRN-28-10 network, we observe only 0.3 percentage point degradation in era, which
is significantly lower than 1.4 percentage point degradation incurred for a smaller WRN-28-4 network.
6.1 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we study the interplay between neural network pruning and robust training objectives.
We argue for integrating the robust training objective in the pruning technique itself by formulating
pruning as an optimization problem and achieve state-of-the-art benign and robust accuracy, simulta-
neously, across different datasets, network architectures, and robust training techniques. An open
research question is to further close the performance gap between non-pruned and pruned networks.
3When searched with improved technique from Salman et al. [33], we find a even better sub-network with
64.3% vra-s.
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Broader Impact
Our work provides an important capability for deploying machine learning in safety critical and
resource constrained environments. Our compressed networks provide a pathway for higher efficiency
in terms of inference latency, energy consumption, and storage. On the other hand, these networks
provide robustness against adversarial examples, including verified robustness properties, mitigating
test-time attacks on critical ML services and applications. Recent work has leveraged adversarial
examples against neural networks for positive societal applications, such as pushing back against
large-scale facial recognition and surveillance. The development of robust networks may hinder
such societal applications. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the limits and capabilities of
compressed networks in safety critical environments, as failure to develop robust systems can also
have catastrophic consequences. Our approach does not leverage any biases in data.
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A Experimental Setup
We conduct extensive experiments across three datasets, namely CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet. For each
dataset, we pre-train the networks with a learning rate of 0.1. We perform 100 training epochs for CIFAR-10,
SVHN and 90 epochs for ImageNet. In the pruning step, we perform 20 epochs for CIFAR-10, SVHN and
90 epochs for ImageNet. We experiment with VGG-16 [36], Wide-ResNet-28-4 [46], CNN-small, and CNN-
large [43] network architectures. Since both MixTrain and CROWN-IBP methods only work with small scale
networks (without batch-normalization), we use only CNN-large and CNN-small for them. We split the training
set into a 90/10 ratio for training and validation for tuning the hyperparameters. Once hyperparameters are fixed,
we use all training images to report the final results.
Adversarial training: We use the state-of-the-art iterative adversarial training setup (based on PGD) with l∞
adversarial perturbations on CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset. The maximum perturbation budget, the number
of steps, and perturbations at each step are selected as 8, 10, and 2 respectively. In particular, for CIFAR-10,
we follow the robust semi-supervised training approach from Carmon et al. [7], where it used 500k additional
pseudo-labeled images from the TinyImages dataset. For ImageNet, we train using the free adversarial training
approach with 4 replays and perturbation budget of 4 [35]. We evaluate the robustness of trained networks
against a stronger attack, where we use 50 iterations for the PGD attack with the same maximum perturbation
budget and step size.
Provable robust training: We evaluate our pruning strategy under three different provable robust training
settings. We choose an l∞ perturbation budget of 2/255 in all experiments. These design choices are consistent
with previous work [7, 38, 47].
- MixTrain: We use the best training setup reported in Wang et al. [38] for both CIFAR-10 and SVHN. In
specific, we use sampling number k′ as 5 and 1 for CNN-small and CNN-large. We select α = 0.8 to balance
between regular loss and verifiable robust loss. The trained networks are evaluated with symbolic interval
analysis [40, 39] to match the results in Wang et al. [38].
- CROWN-IBP: We follow the standard setting in Zhang et al. [47] for CROWN-IBP. We set the  scheduling
length to be 60 epochs (gradually increase training  from 0 to the target one), during which we gradually
decrease the portion of verifiable robust loss obtained by CROWN-IBP while increasing the portion obtained by
IBP for each training batch. For the rest of the epochs after the scheduling epochs, only IBP contributes to the
verifiable robust loss. We use IBP to evaluate the trained networks.
- Randomized smoothing: We train the network using the stability training for CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset
(similar to Carmon et al. [7]). We calculated the certified robustness with N0 = 100, N = 104, noise variance
(σ=0.25), and α = 10−3. We choose an l2 budget of 110/255 which gives an upper bound on robustness against
an l∞ budget of 2/255 for CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset.
Table 6: All neural network architectures, with their number of parameters, used in this work.
Name Architecture Parameters
VGG4 conv 64→ conv 64→ conv 128→ conv 128→ fc 256→ fc 256→ fc 10 0.46m
VGG16 conv 64→ conv 64→ conv 128→ conv 128→ conv 256→ conv 256→ conv 256→ conv 512→ conv 512→ conv 512→ conv 512→ conv 512→ conv 512→ fc 256→ fc 256→ fc 10 15.30m
CNN-small conv 16→ conv 32→ fc 100→ fc 10 0.21m
CNN-large conv 32→ conv 32→ conv 64→ conv 64→ fc 512→ fc 512→ fc 10 2.46m
WideResNet-28-4 Proposed architecture from Zagoruyko et al.[46] 6.11m
ResNet50 Proposed architecture form He et al. [21] 25.50m
Pruning and fine-tuning: Except for learning rate and the number of epochs, pruning and fine-tuning have
similar training parameters as pre-training. We choose the number of epochs as 20 in all experiments (if not
specified). Similar to pre-training, for pruning we choose learning of 0.1 with cosine decay. Often when this
learning rate is too high (in particular for MixTrain and CROWN-IBP), we report results with the learning of
0.001 for the pruning step. Fine-tuning is done with a learning rate of 0.01 and cosine decay. To make sure that
the algorithm does not largely prune fully connected layers that have most parameters, we constrain it to prune
each layer by equal ratio.
A.1 Validating robustness against stronger attacks
Iterative adversarial training [30] has long withstood its performance against attacks of varied strength [2]. It
is natural to ask whether our compressed networks bears the same strength. To evaluate it, we measure the
robustness of our compressed network against stronger adversarial attacks.
Increasing attack steps and the number of restarts. With increasing step-size, i.e, enabling adversary to
search for stronger adversarial examples, we choose the perturbation budget for each step with the 2.5∗
steps
rule
suggested by Madry et al. [30]. Figure 3 shows the results for networks trained on CIFAR-10 datasets. It shows
that gains in adversarial attack strength saturate after a certain number of attacks steps since the robust accuracy
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stops decreasing significantly. Similarly, with 100 random restarts for VGG-16 at 95% pruning ratio, we observe
only a 0.6 percentage point decrease in era compared to the baseline. Note that the pre-trained network also
incurs an additional 0.7 percentage point degradation in era with 100 random restarts, suggesting that compressed
networks behave similarly to pre-trained, i.e., non-compressed, networks under stronger adversarial attacks. We
use 50 attack steps with 10 restarts for all adversarial attacks in our evaluation.
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Figure 3: Empirical adversarial accuracy (era) of com-
pressed networks with increasing number of steps in
projected gradient descent (PGD) based attack. Beyond
a certain number steps, era is largely constant with in-
crease in steps. Results are reported for compressed net-
works up to 99% pruning ratio with CIFAR-10 dataset.
Evaluation with auto-attack [9]. With auto-attack,
which is an ensemble of gradient-based and gradient-
free attacks, we observe similar trend for compressed
networks compared to non-compressed, i.e., pre-
trained networks. For example, the era of pre-trained
VGG-16 with auto-attacks is 48.3% (3.6 percentage
points lower than era with PGD-50 attack). In con-
trast, era of a 95% pruned VGG-16 network is 44.8,
which is again only 3.7 percentage points lower than
PGD-50 attack. In comparison to the PGD-50 base-
line, the decrease in era with auto-attack is compara-
ble for pre-trained, i.e., non-compressed, and pruned
networks.
A.2 Network architectures
Table 6 contains the architecture and parameters de-
tails of the neural networks used in this work. For
WideResNet-28-4 and ResNet-50, we use the original
architectures proposed in Zagoruyko et al. [46] and
He et al. [21], respectively. CNN-large and CNN-small are similar to architectures used in Wong et al. [43].
VGG4 and VGG16 are the the variants of original VGG architecture [36].
A.3 Comparison with Ramanujan et al. [32]
While our approach to solving the optimization problem in the pruning step is inspired by Ramanujan et al. [32],
we note that the goals of the two works have several significant differences. Their work aims to find sub-networks
with high benign accuracy, hidden in a randomly initialized network, without the use of fine-tuning. In contrast,
(1) we focus on multiple types of robust training objectives, including verifiably robust training, (2) we employ
pre-trained networks in our pruning approach, as opposed to randomly initialized networks, and (3) we argue for
further fine-tuning of pruned networks resulted from the optimization problem to further boost performance.
We further employ an additional scaled-initialization mechanism which is the key driver of the success of our
pruning technique. In contrast to their work which searches for sub-networks close to 50% pruning ratio, our
goal is to find highly compressed networks (up to 99% pruning ratio).
B Further details on ablation studies
In this section, we further discuss the ablation studies for the pruning step in detail.
B.1 Choice of scaling factor in importance scores initialization
Recall that we use s(0)i = γ ×
√
6
fan-ini
× 1
max(|θpretrain,i|) × θpretrain,i to initialize the importance scores in
each layer, where γ is the scaling factor. We use
√
k
fan−in , with k = 6, as the scaling factor. Note the our
choice of k is also motivated by an earlier work from He et al. [20]. We also provide an ablation study with
different values of k in Table 7, where measure performance of each scaling factor after the pruning step, i.e., no
fine-tuning. First it demonstrate that the performance without a scaling factor, i.e., γ=1, is much worse. Next it
validate our choice of k = 6, as it outperforms other choice for k.
B.2 How much data is needed for supervision in pruning?
We vary the number of samples used from ten to all training images in the dataset for solving the ERM in the
pruning step for CIFAR-10 dataset at a 99% pruning ratio. Fig. 4 shows there results. Data corresponding to
zero samples refers to the least weight-magnitude based heuristic as it is used to initialize the pruning step. As
the amount of data (number of samples) used in the pruning step increases, the robustness of the pruned network
after fine-tuning also increases. For CIFAR-10, a small number of images doesn’t help much in finding a better
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Table 7: Ablation over different values of k in the choice of scaling factor for the proposed initialization of
importance scores. We focus on the pruning step, i.e., no fine-tuning, for a VGG-16 network at 99% pruning
ratio. We use k=6 in our experiments.
k No-scaling 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Benign accuracy 57.9 62.4 64.5 66.8 66.7 66.4 65.0 66.1
era 31.6 33.9 35.7 35.8 34.7 35.7 33.2 35.2
pruned network. However, the transition happens around 10% of the training data (5k images for CIFAR-10)
after which an increasing amount of data helps in significantly improving the era.
B.3 Number of training epochs for pruning.
We vary the number for epochs used to solve the ERM problem for the pruning step from one to hundred. For
each selection, the learning rate scheduler is cosine annealing with a starting learning rate of 0.1. Fig. 5 shows
these results where we can see that an increase in the number of epochs leads to a network with higher era after
fine-tuning. Data corresponding to zero epochs refers to the least weight-magnitude based heuristic since it
is used to initialize the pruning step. We can see that even a small number of pruning epochs are sufficient to
achieve large gains in era and the gains start diminishing as we increase the number of epochs.
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Figure 4: Era of compressed networks with varying
number of samples used in the pruning step at 99%
pruning ratio for a VGG16 network and CIFAR-10
dataset.
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Figure 5: Era of compressed networks with vary-
ing number of epochs used in the pruning step with
VGG16 network and CIFAR-10 dataset.
C Additional experimental Results
In this section, we first study the impact of sparsity in the network in the presence of benign and robust training.
Next, we present the limitation of least weight magnitude pruning in the presence of robust training and discuss
the choice of this heuristic as a baseline. After that, we study the improvement in the generalization of some
networks after the proposed pruning technique. Next, we provide additional visualization on comparison of both
techniques across the end-to-end compression pipeline. After that, we demonstrate the success of the proposed
pruning technique with benign training. Finally we present integration of pruning technique with quantization,
multi-step pruning, and structured pruning.
C.1 Sparsity hurts more with robust training.
We first study the impact of sparsity in the presence of benign training and adversarial training. Fig. 6 shows
these results, where we train multiple networks from scratch with different sparsity ratio and report the fractional
decrease in performance compared to the non-sparse network trained from scratch. For each training objective
(adversarial training or benign training) and sparsity ratio, we train an individual VGG4 network. These results
show that robustness decreases at a faster rate compared to clean accuracy with increasing sparsity. Consider
robust training against a stronger adversary (=8), where at 75% sparsity ratio, the era reduced to a fraction of
0.74 of the non-sparse network. The fractional decrease in test accuracy for a similar setup is only 0.92. Even
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defending against a weaker adversary (=2), robust accuracy is hard to achieve in the presence of sparsity. The
fractional decrease in era is .79 against this weaker adversary at 75% sparsity level. With the increasing size of
the baseline network, such as VGG16, WideResNet-28-4 size, the rate of degradation of robustness with sparsity
decreases but it still decays faster than the test accuracy.
This observation is closely related to the previously reported relationship between adversarial training and the
size of neural networks [30, 44]. In particular, Madry et al. [30] demonstrated that increasing the width of the
network improves robust accuracy to a large extent. We complement these observations by highlighting that
further reducing the number of parameters (before training) reduces the robustness at a much higher rate.
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Figure 6: Compression hurts more in presence of
adversarial training. We plot the fraction decrease
in accuracy (+) for networks trained with benign
training and robustness for different networks trained
with adversarial training against varying adversarial
strength.
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Figure 7: Comparison of LWM and proposed prun-
ing technique across varying adversarial perturbation
budget () in adversarial training for VGG16 network
on CIFAR-10 dataset.
C.2 Combining network pruning with robust training
We can further integrate the network pruning pipeline with robust training by updating the loss objective. For
example, to achieve an empirically robust network, we can pretrain and fine-tuning a network with adversarial
training (selecting Lpt = Lf = Ladv). Similarly, for other robust training mechanisms, we can use their
respective loss functions. Next, we discuss the limited performance of least weight magnitude (LWM) based
pruning.
Limitation of least weight magnitude based heuristic. Though pruning with least weight magnitude based
heuristic brings some gains in improving the robust accuracy of the network, there still exists a large room for
improvement. For example, at a 99% pruning ratio for a VGG16 network, it still incurs a decrease in era by
17.6 percentage points compared to the non-pruned i.e., pre-trained network. We also observe a non-linear drop
in performance with increasing adversarial strength in adversarial training. Consider Fig. 7, where we report
the performance of the pre-trained networks along with the compressed network (at 99% pruning ratio) from
the pruning pipeline for different adversarial perturbation budgets in adversarial training. Against a weaker
adversary, where the pre-trained network is highly robust, weight-based pruning heuristic struggles to achieve
high robustness after compression. At smaller perturbation budgets, this gap increases further with the increase
in adversarial strength.
C.3 Why focus on pruning and fine-tuning based compression pipeline
We focus on pruning and fine-tuning approach because it achieves the best results among all three pruning
strategies namely pruning before training, run-time pruning, and pruning after training i.e., pruning and fine-
tuning. This is because the other approaches are constrained and tend to do pruning in a less flexible manner or
with incomplete information. On the other hand, despite the simplicity, pruning and fine-tuning based on least
weight magnitude [19] can itself achieve highly competitive results [29]. With similar motivation, we integrate
this approach with robust training and select it as the baseline. This simplicity also allows us to integrate different
training objectives, such as adversarial training and verifiable robust training.
C.4 Increase in generalization with pruning
For verifiable training with CROWN-IBP, we observe improvement in generalization across all experiments
ranging from 0.9-1.5 percentage points. Note that both proposed and baseline techniques can improve the
generalization. This further highlights how network pruning itself can be used to improve the generalization of
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verified training approaches. Table 8 summarizes these results for proposed pruning methods where we observe
improvement in robust accuracy after pruning at multiple pruning ratios.
C.5 Additional comparisons across end-to-end pruning pipeline
Table 8: Verified robust accuracy with CROWN-IBP
with the proposed pruning methods for CNN-large net-
work and CIFAR-10 dataset.
Pruning ratio 0 10 30 50 70 80 90
vra-t 45.5 46.1 46.0 45.9 45.9 46.0 46.1
In figure 8, we present additional comparisons of
LWM and proposed pruning approach across the
end-to-end compression pipeline. Though both ap-
proaches use the identical pre-trained network, the
proposed approach searches for a better pruning archi-
tecture in the pruning steps itself. Fine-tuning further
improves the performance of these networks. For the
WRN-28-4 network on the SVHN dataset, we also
observe that the fine-tuning step decreases the perfor-
mance to some extent for the proposed approach. We hypothesize that this behavior could be due to an imbalance
in the learning rate at the end of the pruning step and the start of the fine-tuning step. With further-hyperparameter
tuning, our approach can achieve higher gains for this network. However, for an impartial comparison with
baseline, we avoid excessive tuning of hyperparameters for the proposed approach and use a single set of
hyperparameters across all networks. The results are reported on a randomly partitioned validation of the
CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset at a 99% pruning ratio.
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Figure 8: Comparison of proposed pruning approach with least weight magnitude (LWM) based pruning at
99% pruning ratio for robust training with iterative adversarial training.
C.6 Performance with benign training
In this work, we have largely focused on demonstrating the success of the proposed pruning approach with
multiple robust training objectives. However, it is natural to ask whether the proposed approach also has the
same advantage with benign training i.e., in the absence of an adversary. We compare the performance of LWM
and our approach for VGG16 and WRN-28-4 across CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset in Table 9. Similar to robust
training, our approach is also successful with benign training where it outperforms LWM based pruning in all
experiments. In particular, even at a 99% pruning ratio, the proposed approach can maintain the accuracy within
1.2 percentage points for the SVHN dataset.
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Table 9: Performance of LWM and proposed pruning technique for benign training.
Architecture VGG16 WRN-28-4
Pruning ratio 0% 95% 99% 0% 95% 99%
CIFAR-10
LWM
95.1±0.1 93.2±0.1 86.1±0.1 95.8±0.2 94.9±0.2 89.2±0.2
HYDRA 94.6±0.1 90.4±0.2 95.5±0.2 91.2±0.2
SVHN
LWM
95.9±0.1 95.5±0.1 93.6±0.1 96.4±0.1 96.1±0.1 93.9±0.1
HYDRA 95.6±0.2 95.2±0.1 96.3±0.1 95.2±0.2
C.7 Further compression after integration with quantization
We also observe that our pruned networks can be easily quantized up to 8-bits (additional 4× compression)
without leading to significant degradation of accuracy or robustness. We report these results in Table 10 for the
VGG-16 network with CIFAR-10 dataset and 99% pruning ratio. It shows that the accuracy of even 99% pruned
networks doesn’t degrade beyond 0.4 percentage points up to 8-bits. We observe similar accuracy as original
networks for up to 12-bits quantization. Note that the non-pruned network also incurs similar degradation in
performance. Since the quantized networks have discontinuous gradients, thus not amenable to PGD attacks, we
use transferability and black-box based attacks to measure robustness. For transfer-based attacks, we transfer
adversarial examples from the original 32-bit width network. For a black-box attack, we use the Square attack [1].
While both attacks are only surrogate of PGD attacks, they do show a similar trend for both non-pruned and
pruned networks at lower bit-widths.
Table 10: Performance with up to 6-bit quantization for both non-pruned, i.e., pre-trained, and 99% pruned
VGG-16 network using our technique on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Bits
Non-pruned 99% pruned
Benign
accuracy
Robust accuracy Benign accuracy Robust accuracy
Transfer-based Gradient-free Transfer-based Gradient-free
12 82.7 60.8 64.1 73.1 49.4 52.4
8 82.5 62.1 71.7 72.7 51.0 61.2
6 81.2 61.0 75.4 72.5 50.6 65.4
C.8 Detailed results on multi-step pruning
We compare the performance of proposed technique (single-step) with multi-step pruning using LWM, and
summarize the top-1 and top-5 era obtained by each pruning strategy in Table 11. Though multi-step pruning
can increase the performance of LWM, our approach still outperforms it by a large extent. For example, at 95%
pruning ratio, multi-step pruning increases the era by 0.3 percentage points but it is still 1.5 percentage points
lower than our proposed approach. Note that the performance of our proposed techniques can also be further
increased with a multi-step approach, which however will incur additional computational overhead.
C.9 Structured pruning
We present our results with structured pruning, i.e., filter pruning, in Table 12 for a VGG-16 network with
adversarially training on CIFAR-10 dataset. Our pruning approach outperforms Adv-LWM baseline for structured
pruning too, where we achieve up to 1.1 and 3.3 percentage point increase in benign accuracy and era respectively.
Table 11: Comparisons of top-1,5 era obtained by
single step LWM, multi-step LWM, and proposed ap-
proach on ImageNet dataset.
Pruning ratio 95% 99%
top-1 top-5 top-1 top-5
Adv-LWM single step 19.6 43.3 9.8 24.4
Adv-LWM multi-step 19.9 45.2 8.4 23.2
HYDRA single-step 21.4 46.6 13.0 31.2
Table 12: Benign-accuracy/era for structured pruning
on a VGG-16 networks and CIFAR-10 dataset.
Pruning ratio 0 50 90
Adv-LWM
0/0
51.8/34.7 17.9/16.4
HYDRA 52.9/38.0 18.3/16.7
∆ +1.1/+3.3 +0.4/+0.3
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D Visualization of pruned weights
Recall that for each of the learning objectives, the SGD in the pruning step starts from the same solution
obtained from the least weight-magnitude based pruning due to our scaled-initialization. However, with each
epoch, we observe that SGD pruned certain connections with large magnitude as opposed to connections with
smaller magnitude. Fig. 9, 10 shows the results after 20 epochs where a significant number of connections with
smaller magnitude are not pruned (in contrast to the LWM approach). Another intriguing observation is that
even the SGD based solver finds connections with very small magnitudes unnecessary and prunes them away.
This phenomenon is particularly visible for adversarial training and randomized smoothing where a significant
number of connections with very small magnitude are also pruned away by the solver. This phenomenon also
exists for MixTrain and CROWN-IBP but the fraction of such connections is very small and thus not clearly
visible in the visualizations. One reason behind this could be that both of these learning objectives are biased
towards learning connections with smaller magnitudes [14].
Fig. 9, 10 present the visualization for pruned connection for adversarial training and randomized smoothing for
each layer in the VGG16 network for CIFAR-10 dataset. Fig. 11, 12 presents similar visualization for MixTrain
and CROWN-IBP for CNN-large networks.
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Figure 9: Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for adversarial training.
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Figure 10: Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for randomized smoothing
based training.
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Figure 11: Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for MixTrain.
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Figure 12: Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for CROWN-IBP.
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